01 / TECHNOLOGY

Security, specified from the foundations.

Xenorra’s research specifies cryptographic primitives for distinct responsibilities. The objective is a coherent security architecture—not a claim that one algorithm solves every problem.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUITE

Standards translated into engineering choices.

The draft specifies ML-DSA-65 for ordinary signing, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s for recovery, SHA3-256 for hashing and hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 peer transport.

01ML-DSA-65
02SLH-DSA
03SHA3-256
04ML-KEM-768
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUITE

Different keys. Different responsibilities.

The proposed suite distinguishes transaction authorization, recovery, transport and governance responsibilities.

01

ML-DSA-65 · FIPS 204

Default transaction signatures, validator votes and node identity. The paper lists a 3,309-byte signature and a 1,952-byte public key.

02

SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s · FIPS 205

Hash-based account recovery path, deliberately distinct from everyday lattice-based signing.

03

ML-DSA-87

Stronger-signature profile proposed for validator operators and governance roles.

04

SHA3-256

Consensus hashing and domain-separated commitments use SHA3-256.

THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STACK

Distinct trust boundaries. Distinct algorithms.

The draft assigns cryptographic primitives by responsibility: transaction authentication, recovery, validator governance, hashing and encrypted peer transport each have explicit roles.

01 / RESEARCH NOTEML-DSA-65

TRANSACTIONS & VALIDATOR VOTES

FIPS 204 signature scheme for normal transaction authorization and consensus voting.

02 / RESEARCH NOTESLH-DSA

RECOVERY PATH

Hash-based SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s provides an alternative recovery assumption.

03 / RESEARCH NOTEML-KEM-768

HYBRID TRANSPORT

Combined with X25519 for authenticated peer transport, with ML-DSA channel binding.

The proposed suite registry supports controlled cryptographic evolution; the research does not promise immunity to all future attacks.

PEER SECURITY

A hybrid approach to transport.

Peer channels combine classical and post-quantum key establishment, with authentication tied to the resulting session.

01

X25519 + ML-KEM-768

Hybrid key establishment combines the two shared secrets rather than relying solely on one family of assumptions.

02

Channel binding

ML-DSA node identity authentication is bound to the negotiated peer channel.

03

Cryptographic agility

A suite registry and explicit upgrade mechanisms are part of the proposed architecture.

04

Security assumptions

Security depends on hardness assumptions and correct implementation; the paper expressly rejects “quantum-proof” guarantees.

THE DESIGN CONSTRAINT

Large signatures change everything.

Post-quantum authorization material dominates transaction size. The protocol addresses this through witness segregation, bounded verification and history management.

3,309 bytesML-DSA-65 signature size reported in the paper.
1,952 bytesML-DSA-65 public key size reported in the paper.
~95%Analytical reduction in long-term history growth from witness separation and pruning, not a measured result.
Not benchmarkedNo empirical throughput, latency or storage benchmarks are reported in the draft.