ML-DSA-65 · FIPS 204
Default transaction signatures, validator votes and node identity. The paper lists a 3,309-byte signature and a 1,952-byte public key.
Xenorra’s research specifies cryptographic primitives for distinct responsibilities. The objective is a coherent security architecture—not a claim that one algorithm solves every problem.
The draft specifies ML-DSA-65 for ordinary signing, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s for recovery, SHA3-256 for hashing and hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 peer transport.
The proposed suite distinguishes transaction authorization, recovery, transport and governance responsibilities.
Default transaction signatures, validator votes and node identity. The paper lists a 3,309-byte signature and a 1,952-byte public key.
Hash-based account recovery path, deliberately distinct from everyday lattice-based signing.
Stronger-signature profile proposed for validator operators and governance roles.
Consensus hashing and domain-separated commitments use SHA3-256.
THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STACK
The draft assigns cryptographic primitives by responsibility: transaction authentication, recovery, validator governance, hashing and encrypted peer transport each have explicit roles.
FIPS 204 signature scheme for normal transaction authorization and consensus voting.
Hash-based SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s provides an alternative recovery assumption.
Combined with X25519 for authenticated peer transport, with ML-DSA channel binding.
The proposed suite registry supports controlled cryptographic evolution; the research does not promise immunity to all future attacks.
Peer channels combine classical and post-quantum key establishment, with authentication tied to the resulting session.
Hybrid key establishment combines the two shared secrets rather than relying solely on one family of assumptions.
ML-DSA node identity authentication is bound to the negotiated peer channel.
A suite registry and explicit upgrade mechanisms are part of the proposed architecture.
Security depends on hardness assumptions and correct implementation; the paper expressly rejects “quantum-proof” guarantees.
Post-quantum authorization material dominates transaction size. The protocol addresses this through witness segregation, bounded verification and history management.